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1298 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
left dead. Events in Hungary demonsuared rhar rhe Soviet 
Union had no intention of relinquishing control over irs 
satellites in Eastern Europe. 
Beyond rhe Soviet sphere of control, Chinese Com-
munist Parry chairman Mao Tse-rung began expressing 
di ssa tisfaction wirh Khrushchev's leadership fo llowing 
Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in 1956. Chinese 
discontent stemmed from low levels of Soviet aid ro 
China and the ovier rapprochement with rhe West, 
which Mao rejected as a betrayal of Marxism-Leninism. 
The dispute between miliranr China and Khrushchev's 
more moderate Soviet Un ion developed in ro a schism in 
rhe world Communist movemenr after 1960. Albania 
abandoned rhe Soviet camp ro become an ally of China, 
wh ile Rom ania distanced itself from rhe Soviet Union in 
international affai rs. The world Communist movemenr 
was no longer Moscow's alone. 
Soviet relations wirh rhe West seesawed between rel ax-
arion and crisis. Khrushchev professed ro desire peaceful 
coexistence, nor least ro al low rhe Soviet Union ro develop 
irs economy. His meetings wirh U.S. presidenrs and his 
tour of the Un ited Stares in 1959 demonstrated a sincere 
con:mirmenr ro friendly relations. This emerging coop-
erano n was dealt a blow in 1960 when an American U-2 
spy plane was shot down over Soviet territory. Khrushchev 
demanded a personal apology from EisenJ10wer and can-
celed a summit meeting in Paris. The standoff over Berlin 
came the following year. Khrushchev insisted that the 
western secrors of the ciry be incorporated inro East Ger-
many. When his demands were nor mer, he authorized 
rh ~ e_recrio~ ~f rhe Berlin Wall. Finally, during rhe Cuban 
Mtsstl e Cmts of Ocrober 1962, relations between the 
United Stares and the Soviet Un ion deteriorated ro rheir 
worst point during rhe Cold War. In an attempt ro im-
pr~ve rhe ovier negotiating position, Khrushchev tried 
ro tnsrall nuclear missil es around the island nation . A U.S. 
blockade and threats of war convinced Kh h h rus c ev ro 
back down. Tension eased in 1963 with rhe esrablish-
menr of a "hor line" between Washington and Moscow. 
In rhe same y ar, rhe Soviet Union, Britain , and the 
Untred Stares signed the ParriaJ Tesr Ban Treary. 
By 1964 ~ru h~hev's prestige ar home was seriously 
erode?. T he mdusrnal and agricultural refo rms that had 
promtsed so much yielded little. T he Sov t. er U . ' . 
. nton s 111-
ternanonal srarure suffe red greatly in the wa.k f h 1. . . eo t e sp tr 
wtth Chl!1a and rhe Berlin and Cuba . Kh 
, . n cnses. ru-
shchev s_ efforts ro tmprove relations with the Wesr had 
anrago ntzed many in the oviet military establishment. In 
Ocrober 1964, while Khru hchev was vacau· . . h 
C 
. . . onmg tn r e 
nmea, the parry Prestdium voted him our of fifi o ce. 
Kl1 rushchev's reforms, though ambitious w . 
' ere tncon 
sisrenr and often unsuccessfu l. On balance h · 
' owever, he 
was an agent of reform and progress. He sough 
1
. 
. . t to e tm. 
mare excessive bureaucracy and improve rhe 11· · Vtng stan 
dards of Soviet citizens. He attempted "O ease · . 
. . • tnterna-
nonal renstons through rapprochement with the \Yf, 
Most sign ificantly, Khrushchev's repudiation ofSt 1· ~t. a tntsm 
began a process of democratization thar laid the founda. 
rions for rhe reforms of M ikhail Gorbachev. 
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SEE ALSO Cuban Missi le Crisis; D etente 
Nuclear Weapons 
As of the early 1950s rhe Soviet nuclear arsenal grew from 
a few dozen atomic bombs to an es timated rhirry cl10u· 
sand to forry thousand nuclear warheads. With the 
breakup of rhe USSR in 1991 , rhe very real potencial 
existed rhar some of iliose weapons, or enough weapons· 
grade material to create crude nuclear devices, would find 
their way via rhe black marker ro terrorist organizations 
or outlaw stares. Concern over rhe accidental detonation 
of one or more of me remaining nuclear devices has also 
been expressed because of rhe lack of proper maintenance 
procedures. 
Scholars have divided the Soviet nuclear weapons pro· 
gram inro four phases. The early development of me pro· 
gram stretched from 1940 until rile mid-1950s. The Ura-
nium Commission was established in June 1940 wicl1 a 
broad research mandate iliat included exploration for ura-
nium deposits. Research was temporarily disrupted with 
the German invasion of June 1941, but then continued 
with a new sense of urgency after Soviet spys uncovered 
rhe existence of other programs. Wirh tile U.S. derona-
cion of aromic fission bombs over Hiroshima and Naga-
saki in August 1945, Stalin gave the Soviet nuclear weap-
ons program an even greater prioriry. 
The first Soviet nuclear chain reaction rook place on 
December 25, 1946. This was followed by the detonation 
of the first Soviet atomic bomb on July 29, 1949, and 
rwo further nuclear rests in fall 1951. These rests were 
followed by the detonation of a thermonuclear fusion 
bomb on August 12, 1953. The deployment of nuclear 
weapons by the Soviet armed forces began in lare 1953 
or early 1954. These devices were initially placed either 
0 11 the older Tu-4 Bull or II-28 Beagle bombers. In March 
1954 custodial and transport duri es for all nuclear devices 
were assigned to the Committee for Stare Securiry (KGB). 
In 1955 two inrerconrinenral bombers, the Tu-95 Bear 
and Mya-4 Bison, were deployed along with rhe SS-3 
medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). 
The second phase of Soviet nuclear weapons devel-
opment rook place between the mid-1950s and mid-
I960s, centering on the expansion of the Soviet nuclear 
arsenal. The first submarine-launched ballistic missile 
(SLBM)-rhe SS-N-4 Sark-was rest-fired from a rerro-
firred Zulu class arrack submarine in 1955. By 1960 rhis 
SLBM reached operational status aboard Golf and Zulu 
class ballistic missile submarines. The first Soviet inter-
continental ballistic missile (ICBM) , rhe SS-6 Sapwood, 
was rest-fired in 1957 and deployed in 1959. The de-
ployment of nuclear torpedoes and sea-launched cruise 
missiles (SLCMs) had taken place a year earli er in 1958. 
The fielding of growing numbers of other nonstrategic 
nuclear weapons such as artillery shells, rockers, and mis-
siles also rook place during rhis era. By 1959 rhis resulted 
in a consensus by rhe Soviet military that the use of nu-
clear weapons in future warfare was a certainry. Because 
of this snifr in Soviet perspective, a new service was cre-
ated, labeled rhe Strategic Rocker Forces (SRF). T he SRF 
quickly became the premier Soviet armed service and the 
foundation of irs military doctrine based on nuclear-war 
fighting. As an outcome, the land-based missile force be-
came the dominant arm of rhe Soviet nuclear triad. 
The third phase of this program spanned the late 
1960s to rhe early 1980s; ir represented rhe achievement 
of nuclear pariry with the United Stares and an era of 
arms control rall<S that limited the growth of rhe super-
powers' nuclear arsenals. These arms control talks, how-
ever, provided far more benefits to rhe Soviet nuclear 
weapons program than ro rhar of rhe United Stares be-
cause of radically different premises regarding the basic 
inrenr behind such negotiations. The Soviets bargained 
primarily from a nuclear war-fighting perspective, while 
rhe United States did not. Hence, arms control supported 
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the Soviet military doctrine based on nuclea r weapons 
civi l defense, and antibal listic mi ile (ABM) program 
that would prepare the U SR for nuclear war. 
Increased accuracy, range, and r li abil ity characterized 
the new generations of ovier I BMs and LBMs de-
ployed during this period. M ul rip le-ind pendently-
targeted-reentry vehicles (MIRVs) wer de[ loyed on 
SS-18 aran and -19 rilerro I BMs in 1974 wh ile 
the first MIRVed LBM was deployed in 1978. T he fir r 
mobile ICBM, the -25 icicle, was in turn fielded in 
1985 . Coupled with these advance in ballistic miss ile 
were those in long-range cruise mis ile re hnology with 
the deployment of rheAS-Kent 15 on rhe Bear H bomber 
in 1984 and rhe -N-2 1 ampso n in the Northern Fleer 
in 1987. 
The fourth phase of Soviet nuclea r weapons develop-
ment spans the ascendance of Mikhai l Gorbachev in rhe 
mid-1980s, the implosion of rhe Soviet empire, the end 
of the Cold War, and the rise of the Rus ian Federation . 
Ir has been a dynamic period with a declaratory shift in 
Russian doctrine away from nuclear-war fighting toward 
deterrence and greater willingness to engage in more eq-
uitable arms control negotiat ions with the West. 
Wh ile rhe future of the old ovier nuclear weapons 
program is now uncertain , small numbers of qualitatively 
advanced forms of strategic weapons are being developed 
and deployed. If this trend continues and Russian sociery 
successfuJJy rebuilds itself ro exploit the technologies em-
bodied in rhe current revolution in military affairs, a fu-
ture Russian program will easi ly possess the capaciry ro 
outperform irs Soviet predecessor. Th is potential coupled 
with recent Russian doctrinal viewpoints on future " tech-
nological war" (based on advanced military systems) in 
which srraregic objectives can be achieved in an initial 
deep strike provide potent reasons for further efforts to-
ward rl1e control , limi tation, and perhaps total banning 
of nuclear weapons. 
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